Lord Coaker: My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Whitaker, who reminded us of the importance of the law in protecting the rights of individuals against states. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and yet another speech in which he said that the debates and discussions on these groups of amendments bring us to fundamental principles of democracy, including the rights of law, freedom of speech and the separation of powers. Debating and discussing these in the context of the Bill is an important reminder of the power and responsibilities of this Chamber.
I am pleased to support the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, on reasserting the role of the domestic courts. To the noble and learned Baroness and my noble friend I say that it shows what a strange world we live in that, when the current Minister for Illegal Migration was Solicitor-General, he is reported to have told the Government that ignoring interim relief would put us in breach of the ECHR and that they should act with great trepidation. Now he is no longer Solicitor-General but is responsible for illegal migration, and he seems to have forgotten the advice he gave the Government. He could do with reading his own advice. All this, of course, is “so we are told”.
We are also told that the Attorney-General has had serious worries about this, but of course nobody can know about that because legal advice is always kept secret. Although he is the Advocate-General for Scotland, the Minister is not acting in a legal capacity but as a Justice Minister of some sort, and no doubt he will have read the comments made in the other place by various Members about how the Bill works with respect to the interaction with the Scottish judicial system. This is a parallel universe in which we exist, but, none the less, these are all extremely important amendments.
In speaking to my Amendment 48, I wish to highlight a particular aspect that goes alongside Amendment 39 and the others in my noble friend’s name. As a barrack-room lawyer, I take on board the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, with respect to my inadequate amendment and the fact that it does not include interim relief. I apologise profusely for that oversight. In due course, it may return on Report with interim relief.
On a serious point, the Supreme Court said that the main reason it found Rwanda not to be a safe country in general was the risk of refoulement. The Government have gone to great length, in the treaty and in other things they have published, to say that they have dealt with all the concerns the Supreme Court had—although we note that, in its report published a few days ago, the JCHR continues to assert that there are problems that need to be considered.
I draw attention to Clause 4, which allows individuals who have compelling reasons to argue against their deportation under this Bill and the Illegal Migration Act. I remind noble Lords that even this minor concession of allowing individuals to do so, rather than debating the general safety of Rwanda, was regarded as a step too far by many in the Conservative Party and the Government.
My amendment seeks to delete Clause 4(2). I am grateful for the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, although he is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. The particular aspect I draw noble Lords’ attention to is that, although an individual can present compelling circumstances, and try to persuade the Government that this Bill should not apply to them and that they should not be deported to Rwanda, it does not allow them to do so if they say that they should not be sent there as there are reasons why they might be refouled—in other words, sent to a third country.
Under Clause 4(2), they are prohibited from arguing that in the courts. Subsection (2) says this is so
“to the extent that it relates to the issue of whether the Republic of Rwanda will or may remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of … its international obligations”.
It includes the word “will”. An individual cannot even argue that they “will” be sent to another country, never mind that they “may” be—the Government included the word “will”. I find that extraordinary; it is almost that an individual cannot argue in a court, as a matter of fact, that they will be refouled. They cannot say, “I have compelling evidence that I will be sent to a third country”. It is extraordinary that legislation would say that you cannot as an induvial—let alone the point about general safety made by the noble and  learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—argue in a court that you will be refouled. The court could dismiss such an argument, of course, but it would be up to the court—that is the whole point of the courts.
I take the point about interim relief, but I want justification from the Government as to why an individual cannot take that argument to a court, an immigration officer or the Secretary of State. The Home Secretary, or an immigration officer, cannot consider an individual saying to them, “I will be refouled if I am sent to Rwanda”. How on earth is that consistent with the principles of democracy of this country, of which we are all so proud? That is why I tabled the amendment, and I would like to hear the Government’s justification.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich: My Lords, as a signatory to the stand-part proposition in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I will confine my remarks to the question of whether it is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus to international law, for a contracting state to disregard interim measures issued by the European court under Rule 39. Spoiler alert: it is, and the question is not so difficult as some noble Lords have suggested.
I declare an interest as a member of the Bar who has appeared for 30 years or so in that Strasbourg court, both for applicants and for states, and who has therefore been on the wrong end of some Rule 39 measures, including at least one which the court had  to be persuaded to reverse. So I welcome the steps that the European Court of Human Rights is taking, partly at the instigation of this country’s Government, to improve its procedures and make them more transparent, including, as the court itself announced on 23 November last year, the attribution of interim measures to the judges who made them.
We have heard a lot about the Policy Exchange paper of last May. The arguments have been very well summarised in other speeches, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who has spoken to them a couple of times. Happily, I do not need to take your Lordships through those arguments or, indeed, the detailed rebuttals of them, which will be found in the Bingham Centre report of July of last year. Both reports are footnoted in the Constitution Committee report, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has referred. The reason that I do not need to do that is that the position was made completely clear in law by the European court, in a judgment that has been referred to: the 2005 judgment of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov v Turkey.
It has been mentioned, but I will say a little more about it. Of the 17 judges who ruled on this issue in the Grand Chamber, a clear majority of 14 held that Article 34 of the convention, which guarantees the effective exercise of the right of application to the Strasbourg court, is violated when a state fails to comply with interim measures. For 13 of those 14, violation follows automatically from a failure to comply. The 14th thought that there was a violation if, as in Mamatkulov itself, applicants are as a matter of fact prevented from effectively exercising their right of application,
Three judges dissented: those appointed by Turkey, Russia and Liechtenstein. Their dissent is long and tightly argued. Policy Exchange would have been proud to publish it. Its authors looked at the text, the preparatory materials, state practice, the analogy with the International Court of Justice and the relevant rules of international law—all ground covered subsequently by Professor Ekins and tonight by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann. They accused the court, just as Professor Ekins did, of exercising a legislative rather than an interpretative function.
Court cases, unlike academic debates, produce clear winners and losers. The result of Mamatkulov, since followed in other judgments, is quite simply conclusive of the matter. The arguments advanced by the dissenting judges, and later by Professor Ekins, were decisively rejected. Why does this matter? Again, noble Lords have had reference to it: the reason it matters is Article 32 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides two things of importance. First,
“the jurisdiction of the court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation of the convention”.
Secondly, as my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton said:
“In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.
That is really it. The European Court interpreted Article 34 in Mamatkulov as requiring compliance with interim measures issued by the court because, as the court put it in its judgement at paragraph 135, interim measures
“play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that would prevent the Court from properly examining the application and when appropriate securing to the applicant the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted”.
That ruling is binding, as the United Kingdom agreed it would be when we signed and ratified the convention, including Article 32. Perhaps we should not be very surprised that a treaty means what the court constituted to interpret it says that it means. Even the dissenting judges did not suggest otherwise. They did not like the majority judgment, but neither did they describe it, in a word recently used by Professor Ekins, as “lawless”. They accepted it.
State practice since the Mamatkulov decision is supportive of it. The Committee of Ministers, of all the Council of Europe states, resolved in 2010 that
“the Court’s case law has clearly established that Article 34 of the Convention entails an obligation for States Parties to comply with an indication of interim measures made under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court”.
The requirement on states parties to comply with interim measures was reiterated in the Izmir Declaration of 2011 on the Brussels Declaration of 2015, to which of course the United Kingdom was a party. It was endorsed in very clear terms by the French Conseil d’Etat as recently as 7 December last year, when that senior court required a person deported to Uzbekistan in breach of interim measures to be repatriated at the state’s expense.
In a recent email to noble Lords, Policy Exchange described its own 2023 paper as “authoritative”. I am afraid that whoever wrote that was high on their own supply. It is supported neither by the court whose job it is to provide authoritative interpretations of the convention nor by state practice, nor even, subject to anything the Minister may say, and I will be listening carefully, by our own Government. That at any rate is what I take from the last paragraph of the ECHR memorandum on the Bill.
To throw this established position into doubt might once have been merely eccentric; in current conditions, it is positively dangerous. As recently as 2005 there was a culture of compliance. The Strasbourg court could say, in Mamatkulov, paragraph 105:
“Cases of States failing to comply with indicated measures remain very rare”.
However, the “good chaps” theory no longer prevails in the Council of Europe. Russia challenged the jurisdiction of the court in 2021 when it required Alexei Navalny to be immediately released from prison due to the risk to his life and health—interim measures strongly supported by our Government—while Poland challenged it last year when its previous Government refused to comply with interim measures relating to the politicisation of its judiciary.
Supranational courts do not have bailiffs to enforce their decisions. The fabric of international law—that “gentle civiliser of nations”, as it was once described—is easily torn but not so easily repaired. It can be torn by  acts such as that which is proposed to us—acts that enable or facilitate actions in breach of international law.
Clause 5 is peculiar, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, have both said. If Rwanda is as safe, as the Government invite us to declare, Clause 5 is unnecessary. If it is not safe, Clause 5 will compound the injustice of Clause 4. Either way, Clause 5 extends the damage already done by Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act because it severs the link, praised by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, between non-compliance and procedural reform. If we accept this clause, we will not only be authorising Ministers to contravene this country’s obligations; we will be handing an excuse to illiberal Governments across the continent to do the same, and worse. We should be ashamed to do so.